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Canon of St. Paul's, and the Rev. Darwell Stone—the two editors of “The Oxford Library of Practical Theology.” The sound principle laid down is that “even though at the Reformation many things may have been lost which we . . . would have wished to retain, still it is not open to an individual or individuals to reclaim these things by private enterprise.”

The aim of “The Invocation of Saints,” by the second of the authors of the above pamphlet, is to show that “the Church of England left open the “lawfulness and expediency of that limited form of invocation (in private devotion, that is, as distinguished from public worship) which asks the saints for the help of their prayers.” W. S. BISHOP.

“WHY THE MIND HAS A BODY.”

Prof. Strong's “Why the Mind Has a Body” records a protest against materialism on one hand and phenomenalism on the other. The greater amount of emphasis which he lays on the second shows which form of theory he thinks most in need of opposition. His argument is largely metaphysical, and at points invites controversy. For this part of the discussion the distinction between things-in-themselves and events-in-themselves has special significance.

Things-in-themselves, he tells us, and events-in-themselves are the realities symbolized by the phenomena known to us as objects and physical processes, and that particular physical process which we call brain-action symbolizes the reality which we call consciousness. So far, good; but let us see whether we are to call this reality a thing-in-itself or an event-in-itself. Prof. Strong uses the former term. But suppose for a moment that we have before us a dead brain, possessing no consciousness whatever. Since it is a phenomenon in our experience, it must be symbolic of a thing-in-itself, or a combination of things-in-themselves, existing as a reality; and since on Prof. Strong's hypothesis the chain of realities is, like the chain of phenomena, a “locked system,” correspond-

ing with this latter link by link, it follows that no new reality or thing-in-itself can be introduced into the one because the law of conservation of matter demonstrates that nothing can be added to the other. But now suppose that we are able by galvanism or other methods to set up in that dead brain the process symbolic of consciousness—which means, of course, only that the things-in-themselves corresponding to our apparatus are acting on the things-in-themselves corresponding to the combination of phenomenal matter which we call the brain. Consciousness is at once added to the world of realities. As a thing-in-itself or an event-in-itself? If the former, what becomes of the parallelism? If the latter, it is difficult to see the exact place of consciousness in an evolutionary series whose lower members are things-in-themselves, symbolized in our phenomenal order by objects and never by events.

Again, take those cases when a part of consciousness is destroyed by the removal of part of the cortex. In the phenomenal world the alteration is only one of position; what does it amount to in the real world? Either the chain of things-in-themselves has lost a link, without any corresponding diminution in the sum total of phenomenal matter, or else consciousness is not a thing-in-itself, but bears the same relation to things-in-themselves that brain-activity does to brain-matter, which conclusion seems not to be just the one at which Prof. Strong would have us arrive.

But these obscurities will probably be made clear in the other book, in which Prof. Strong promises to continue the subject. Even in that case, however, a last word, applying not to any one point of his theory but to its bearing as a whole, would not be irrelevant. That the "non-rational leap" must inevitably have a place in any theory designed to be ultimate, few would be disposed to deny, and the vigor and courage necessary to the making of such an important one as we find Prof. Strong ready for, no one could refuse to admire; but one may still question at what point of an inquiry that leap becomes legitimate, and one may be pardoned for answering, "*After* the facts have been followed out to their uttermost

logical conclusion." One feels that the empirical order should be transcended only after being completed in terms of empiricism. The physiological psychologist who discards scientific weights and measures before he has applied them rigidly to every datum of the case, and stated the result in scientific terms, seems to make his leap to the indemonstrable too soon—too soon (as in Prof. Strong's case) because its result is likely to be his entanglement in some such scientific-metaphysical paradox as that already noted concerning consciousness as a thing-in-itself.

The late Charles Carroll Everett, in one of his essays, said that the solution of any problem must be sought at the point of greatest difficulty; and that point, in the present inquiry, is the ultimate relation of mind and body. Prof. Strong has sought to do away with the break which most of us find at the end of the scientific argument by finding a number of (presumably) smaller breaks in the course of it. The psychological soundness of the process by which he finds the transcendent in the empirical (in the cases of memory, perception, and the cognition of other minds) is perhaps open to question; but, aside from that possibility, he appears to have changed only the position of the point of difficulty. The man who, dissatisfied with scientific reasons, would transcend them, finds himself trying to span a crevasse with a rope that is too short; to bridge the gulf, it must be pieced out with metaphysics, faith, what not. The adventurer trusts himself to a support whose one end is fast to facts, whose other, knit of the non-rational, holds to what he would have for facts. One sometimes sees a second method tried: to make the great gap less, the rope is lengthened here and there by cutting, and the insertion of a piece of faith, metaphysics, what not; but one doubts whether your bridge is any the stronger, and meanwhile—you have spoiled your rope.

C. A. HARDY.